Abstract:
In the following the development of the US-Russian relations will be reviewed. While concentrating on the cooperation in the last half a dozen years, the analysis will be divided into five stages. The general question is why and how the relations evolved and changed in this period. After summarising shortly the situation in the end of the 1990s, the second paragraph will try to outline and define the American foreign policy and the impact of the events of 9/11 on this policy. Russia’s need and desire of integration with the West will be central to the third phase, focusing on the motivation to join the anti-terror coalition at an early stage. Both powers obtained benefits from their strategic partnership; these advantages are central to the fourth part. The concluding argument, the fifth stage, will name crossroads and ideological differences, which determine the development of US-Russian cooperation in the last six years and will give an outlook to the future.
I. Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission and Afghanistan Working Group:
Throughout the 1990´s the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission was one of the main agreements for cooperation between Russia and the United States of America. At the end of this decade the relations were cooling down; Russia had to deal with an economical crisis as a result of the rapid changes towards a market economy, and the US was occupied by electing a new government.
The republican candidate George W. Bush entered the oval-office in 2000 and Vladimir Putin succeeded Boris Yeltsin in the same year as Russian president. Both countries started a new period of bilateral cooperation, focusing on the threat of international terrorism and its sources already before 9/11. The US-Russian working group on Afghanistan held their first meeting in August 2000 in Washington in response to the Taliban regimes refusal of the UNSC resolution 1267 (read the UNSC resolution 1267 at: http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/sc99.htm), resulting in an agreement to cooperate on extended sanctions against Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the events of the September attacks of 2001 led to a great change in US-Russian relations. The need for a stronger and deeper partnership between the two former Superpowers occurred in the fight against international terrorism. Afghanistan was a question where their interests met. The wounded US, vulnerable after an attack on their territory for the first time since 1812, prepared for a counter-strike. Russia’s interest in cooperation was motivated by the fear of losing influence in Central Asia, if not defeating the unstable Taliban regime.
II. Homeland Defence-The U.S. foreign policy after 9/11:
“The mission determines the coalition.” With this statement Donald Rumsfeld, at the time the US secretary of defence, claimed the importance of the fight against international terrorism. The forming of a global coalition of the willing was a main proxy, determining the country´s foreign policy. The “Pearl Harbour of the industrialized civilization” (STÜRMER, 2001: Zeitenwende; in: Die Welt, September 12th) made homeland defence, and national security tasks most important. Passenger planes had been turned into weapons; no disarmament agreement or ND-treaty could have influenced these events. On the homeland frontier, as well as on the international frontier, the Bush-Administration was promoting an anti-terror coalition, stressing the values of the democratic world. Through a prophetic perception in media and the biblical-rhetoric (HABERMAS, 2001: Glauben und Wissen-Faith and Knowledge) used by President Bush, the events of 2001 were marked as a change; not only in the geopolitical scene.
A change in the balance of power was obviously caused by the terrorist actions and closer international cooperation was needed. Some did even draw a historical analogy with the anti-Hitler coalition of 1941-45 (RUTLAND, 2002: The September Bombings: A Turning Point in US-Russian Relations? , in: International Relations, Vol 16(2), p. 289), though officials in the US government and the American mass media expressed the events as the change. Observing from a more historical point of view we can say that these events did have something special, but not regarding the attacks as a threat against the US or their territory, more in terms of targeting civilians in such great numbers.
Closer cooperation with partners and allies in promoting democracy and enduring freedom can be seen as one side of the coin in the US post-9/11 foreign policy. The other side comprehended legitimacy for the global supremacy of the US as the guardian of the free democratic world. Russia was not only important as a close partner for the Bush-Administration concerning military, strategic and secret service support. Mainly the agreement on the threat of states such as Afghanistan to the democratic world should be stressed in this case, as well as the acceptance of detaining enemy combatants and suspected terrorists in Guantanamo Bay. The illegitimate imprisoning of people “without charge or access to lawyers or family until the White House determines that its ‘war on terror’ has been successfully concluded” (CHOMSKY, 2003: Hegemony or Survival – America’s Quest for global dominance, London, p. 26), needed permission from the international community. Whilst disrespecting the supremacy of the UN as an international actor in conflict management within the framework of the global community, America had to depend on its allies and partners. The aggressive unipolarity, expressed in the post-9/11 foreign policies, was lacking the democratic values they wanted to promote in the undemocratic world, one could argue.
The diplomatic triumph of the anti-terror coalition should not be underestimated. Within the new US-foreign policy, “enemies became Allies, rivals were integrated and the loyalty of friends was reviewed” ( HACKE, 2002: Die amerikanische Außenpolitik nach dem 11. September, in: FRANK/ HIRSCHMANN: Die weltweite Gefahr – Terrorismus als internationale Herausforderung, Berlin, p. 335). If compared with the worldwide coalition against Iraq in 1989/90, this coalition was not equipped with an UN or NATO mandate; it was acting in far more symbolic terms. But, the symbolic power created by the “monumental struggle of good versus evil” (George W. Bush: whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010912-4.html) lost its advocates earlier than expected. Already at the beginning of the Iraq invasion in 2003, America’s efforts to free the world from all rogue states and terrorists was equated with unlimited imperialism. Herfried Muenkler (2005: Neues vom Imperium – Das alte Rom und der 11. September: Reflexionen über politische Ordnungen im Anschluß an Montesquien, in: Welt Online, February 12,) concludes that the US military dominance is one main proxy in defining this imperial position. Important allies as France, Germany and Russia, marked by Donald Rumsfeld as Old Europe, were not willing to support the US hegemony tendencies.
III. Improving relations with the West – Russian foreign policy after 9/11:
“The entire international community should unite in the struggle against terrorism (…) this is a blatant challenge to humanity“. With these words Russian president Vladimir Putin expressed his sympathies with all American people after the September attacks. This article, however, poses that the recognition and acceptance of these events as an affront against civilization is less important than the Russian engagement in the anti-terror-coalition as a strategic partner of the US.
After 1989 the Russian Federation remained as the succeeding nation of the Soviet Union. Still recovering from the effects of the rapid changes caused by the transformation process towards democracy and market economy, Russia had to deal with domestic rather than external problems in the late 1990s. The Economic crisis in 1998, constantly controversial issues on corruption and the never-ending conflicts among the independence of its instable regions as Trans-Dniester, Abkhazia or Chechnya were bothering the political guarantors. The continuing international criticism to the shift in the political system of Russia, towards more authoritative, managed or illiberal characteristics, concerning massive human rights violations, censorship of the media and the deviation of Oligarchs, forced itself upon the attention of Vladimir Putin´s government. International appreciation and acceptance appeared as one of the goals to achieve by participating in the US led anti-terror coalition. Another goal was to gain legitimacy in the war on Chechnya. “While at the end of Yeltsin´s era the issue of Chechnya was a serious liability that had to be compensated for with Russia’s few remaining sources of strength (…) by now the issue of terrorism has become a significant asset to the newly achieved economic dynamism and subsumes the problem of Chechnya” (BAEV, 2005: Counter terrorism as a building block for Putin´s regime, in: Russia as a Great Power – Dimensions of Security under Putin, Poutledge, p. 326).
One should not construe the Russian engagement with a too narrow perspective, as everything was generally in line with Russia’s national interests: Improving relations with the West and regaining strength and acceptance on the global stage. Issues on foreign policy were easily solved; the Russian Federation could associate itself with the only global-power, “surpassing bodies as the NATO, the UN or the EU” (STEPANOVA, 2002: Partners in Need: U.S.-Russian cooperation on and approaches to anti-terrorism, Program in New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS) Policy Memo 279, in: PONARS Policy Conference, Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), p. 2). The US and their partners and allies made the agreements. National governments played a more important role than any international organization.
In the Russian case one should not forget that the president determines the framework of the foreign policy (www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-05.htm). Liberals and moderate actors within the society appreciated Vladimir Putin´s opening to the West, while the conservative and military establishments were sceptical about the involvement of strong powers, such as the US, in the region. But still, Putin´s speech at the security conference in Munich 2007, expressed his belief that Russia regained its strength. The anti-terror coalition should be seen as a milestone in Russian foreign policy, improving relations with the West and reintegrating into the international community.
IV. Benefits of the US-Russian post-9/11 cooperation: A “Give and Take”?
The above-mentioned outlines and determinants of Russian and US foreign policies do not fully express or picture the benefits both powers obtained from their strategic partnership. America was fundamentally weakened by the attacks, losing its position as the sole superpower. From this point of view, each partner and ally was indispensable. But as already mentioned, the prestige of states as Russia was needed to gain legitimacy for the global anti-terrorism operation. Both leaders, Bush and Putin, do not rely on the inviolability of International bodies. “These men reject the so-called “postmodern” diplomacy of the European Union; they distrust the constraints of multilateral institutions and use them only to pursue more narrow purposes” (RICHTER, 2004: A Sense of his Soul: The Relation between Presidents Putin and Bush, Program in New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS) Policy Memo 329, in: PONARS Policy Conference, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), p.2). Without the permission of the UNSC, but backed up with the support of the democratic civilization, the US had a symbolic mandate to bring enduring freedom to the rogue states. The acceptance as the supremacy power in the global political system has to be labelled as one of the main benefits to the US.
The geopolitical position, in a region with near boarders to Afghanistan, China, and the Central European Heartland, made Russia a more important partner than others. Zbigniew Brzezinski (see: The Grand Chessboard-American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives) already mentioned in the late 1990s the significance of the Russian Federation to the US, as a regional power in Europe and Central Asia. Another major determinant could be the acceptance of Russia as a diplomatic mediator in conflicts with failed-states as Iran or North Korea, rethinking the benefits from the cooperation in the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission (AHRARI, 2001: Iran, China, and Russia: The Emerging Anti-US Nexus? In: Security Dialogue, Vol 32(4), p. 455-456).
Focusing on Russia, the acceptance of the authoritative democracy as one of the main partners in a strategic coalition was already a benefit. The American criticism on Russia’s illiberal tendencies was hushed away in the aftermath of 9/11. Nevertheless, the participation included many more benefits: The recognition of the War in Chechnya as a counter-terrorist operation, an end to NATO expansion, the cancellation of Soviet debts and the help for Russia with eventual terrorist attacks. The belittlement of the Chechen conflict seems in this connection most explosive as a benefit for the Russian Federation and a farce for the international community. This argument does not try to neglect that the war in Chechnya became in the late 1990s and early 2000s a struggle against terrorists; or to be more precise: a fight against separatists motivated by Islam. But to not read the growth of terrorist and guerrilla tendencies as a result of the first Chechen campaign would be a mistake as well. As acting president in 1999 and elected president in 2000, Vladimir Putin placed the solution of the conflict in the North Caucasus on top of his agenda.
Whilst bombing civilians and banishing the OSCE working group from Chechnya, the government tried hard to convince the international community that the conflict belonged to the domestic sphere. “We do not need any intermediaries (…) That would be the first step toward internationalizing the conflict. First intermediaries, then somebody else, then observers, then military, and then things will be out of our control”: with these words Putin expressed his concerns about international involvement in the Caucasus in his Autobiography, published in 2000. The gentle criticism on the Russian counter-terrorist operation after 9/11 was a silent agreement to the allocation of the conflict to the domestic sphere. NATO expansion was losing its threat and the international bodies were lacking supremacy. Military and strategic engagements were dependent on membership in the anti-terror coalition. The Russian Federation found itself in the enviable position of a reliable partner concerning questions of international relevance, and could promote its foreign policy aims of economical and political integration with the West.
This mutually beneficial partnership, represented in the line of argumentation, can be seen as a “Give and Take”. It is not needless to emphasize that the US-Russian relations are “not built on an ideological basis but on the careful calculation of its strategic merits” (RYKHTIK, 2003: The United States and Russia Today: A Practical Partnership, Program in New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS) Policy Memo 321, in: PONARS Policy Conference, Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), p. 1).
V. Normalization and Return to confrontation: Iraq, Iran and Georgia as crossroads in US-Russian partnership:
In the final paragraph, the discussion will show what elements of discrepancy are revealing to the development of US-Russian cooperation. Current events should be the guideline to illustrate the alteration of this relation in the past three years.
The beginning of the US Iraq invasion in March 2003 was in general terms a watershed to the anti-terror coalition. Operation Iraqi Freedom could not gain the same unanimous international assent as Operation Enduring Freedom of October 2001. While the US administration promoted a black list of rogue states and invaded Iraq, Russia moved towards more European values and moral concerns. One month before the start of Iraqi Freedom, France and Russia agreed to hamper the US draft of a new resolution on Iraq and illustrated, together with Germany, the need to fight international terrorism, but not by invading Iraq. The Chechen counter-terrorist operation was officially ended, and Russia’s new partners demonstrated that Chechnya was indeed, in contrast to Iraq, a part in the fight against terrorism (BAEV, 2005: Counter terrorism as a building block for Putin´s regime, in: Russia as a Great Power – Dimensions of Security under Putin, Abingdon, p. 327). The concept Old and New Europe as a division between the willing and the schismatic nations, was read as a compliment by Russian officials. The US construction of a threat through weapons of mass destruction and a fictitious connection between Saddam Hussein’s regime and Al-Qaeda did not convince the newly arranged entente in Europe. The recent evidence of American manipulation of facts (SPIEGEL, Peter: Pentagon probe fills in blanks on Iraq war groundwork, in: LA Times, April 6, 2007) showed that the motives behind the Iraq war were questionable.
Russia’s attempt to forebear from the absolute cooperation can be paralleled with the lack of ideological compliance with the US. While European actors were speaking about failed-states, the US insisted on the term Axis of Evil, counting Iran and North Korea as well as Iraq and Syria. Economic ties and strategic partnerships with these states coerced the Russian Federation to diplomatic, rather than military solutions. The nuclear program in Iran for instance is rendered possible through Russian technology and experts, 4.9% of Iranian imports come from Russia. In the newly ordered post-9/11 global system Russia was after 2003 not willing to acknowledge the US supremacy any longer. Strategists in the government, Putin included, were thinking that the US would probably abandon its unilateralism after the attacks. But the Russian president’s speech on the 43rd Security Conference in Munich 2007 illustrated that by now these thoughts are shown to be mistaken. “I consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world. (…) What is even more important is that the model itself is flawed because at its basis there is and can be no foundations for modern civilisation”, concluded the Kremlin leader.
Another crossroad in the strategic partnership was the old question of NATO enlargement in the post-soviet-block and especially the case of Georgia. The Rose Revolution in 2003 had been acclaimed by Moscow, whose officials assisted in solving the conflict peacefully, but the new government, led by Mikheil Saakashvili, assumed highly charged anti-Russian rhetoric and began to urge Putin to withdraw the remaining army camps from Georgia (SOKOV, 2006: The United States between Russia and Georgia, Program in New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS) Policy Memo 407, in: PONARS Policy Conference, Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), p. 2). Immediately after the revolution it was obvious that if Russia would lose influence in Georgia, its influence in the entire region would be gone: geo-strategically an enormous sacrifice. In the fall of 2006 the Kremlin decided to prosecute Georgia with sanctions, after NATO announced negotiations of a potential membership of Georgia and the arrest of Russian officers in Georgia on charges of espionage. Russia’s reaction shows the weight they ascribe to the continuing involvement of the US and their partners in the region of Central Asia, a sphere of influence that in Russian perception belongs to Moscow.
VI. Conclusion:
If we finally try to focus on the future of this relationship, cooperation in terms of amicable agreements between the two states seems inconceivable. The recent development in the discussion on anti-missile defence in East- and Central-Europe illustrates how deep both states are isolated in their own ideological identity, and how much the conflicting interests of Russia and the US dominate global politics in the actual time again. The Kremlin recently provoked by threatening to suspend compliance with the treaty on conventional arms in Europe (CFE), while Condoleeza Rice (secretary of defence) in the ensuing discussion cleverly confused the terms Russian and Soviet.
The central question to the analysis was why and how the relations between the Russian Federation and the US evolved and changed in the last half a dozen years. An adequate answer to the demand why the relations changed is related to the need of an international coalition after the attacks of 9/11. Thus the examination has proved that both the US and Russia only agreed on the strategic cooperation to obtain volitional benefits: international acceptance and integration with the west in the case of Russia, and acceptance of supremacy and legitimacy of the anti-terror coalition in the case of the US. The current collision course defines how the relations evolved: from strategic partnership after the terrorist attacks towards bloc-minded rivalry. Further research could try to analyse why ideology (see: GEERTZ, 1973: Ideology, in: The interpretation of cultures, New York, p. 218-219. ) again becomes a guide in these modern democratic nation-states, as conflicts of the 20th century can be seen as mainly ideological.
In fact, no one can presume that America will dismount its position as the sole superpower. Neither Russia, nor any other state, is equal to be an opponent in a bi- or multipolar world order. The need for rearranged efforts and structures in global politics is obvious since any further disagreement could fuel broader conflicts. Russia has to clarify if their identity will be defined by soviet means or by the basic principles of a democratic nation state, and the US needs to use its global impact more responsibly. A fortress of democracy must rely on diplomatic conflict management rather than war or threat of war to solve conflicts of international relevance. The antagonists bear responsibility, as a global community cannot advance and take part in solution procedures of future conflicts with bloc-minded confrontation. ‘Team play’ needs to be stressed once again as the only benefiting approach to disputes of global relevance. Authorities of both the US and the Russian Federation have to agree to compromises, diplomacy must be the sole solution in conflicts.
The international community cannot allow imminent decisions, (such as the independence status of Kosovo or the set of problems related to Iran’s nuclear program), be influenced or determined by neither Russian nor American interests. There is no need for diplomatic proxy wars. Unfortunately it does not seem realistic to expect the two rivals to pay more attention to international bodies. Hence partners and allies, Great Britain, France, Germany and Norway for example, should express their shared ideas in forthcoming discussions and present a united front to challenge the subjective interests of Russia and the US. Other nation states should be concerned that a potential hidden state of war or some kind of Cold Peace cannot be charcterized as adequate attempts in restructuring the global political stage.
